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V.B. PRICE*

Saved By Scarcity?
In the late 1980s, Albuquerque, New Mexico, seemed to me to be a
unique city in the urban West. Unlike the sprawling uniformity and chaotic
senselessness that infected Phoenix, Tucson, Denver, Los Angeles, San
Diego, and the fastest growing city in the nation, the waterless Las Vegas,
Albuquerque was struggling inwardly to reach a consensus about respectful
growth and maintaining its identity. It was still fighting the good fight to
maintain itself as a modem New Mexican city, adapted to its natural and
cultural contexts, and respecting the limits of both. It has never been an easy
go for Albuquerque. Though the railroad arrived in 1880 and Route 66 went
right through the heart of downtown in the early 1930s, Albuquerque was
isolated by distance and culture from other major cities in the
intermountain west and the west coast. And its identity was confusing. A
college town; a top secret, high tech, military enclave; a rural farming and
ranching regional center; and the business capital of one of the poorest
states in the nation, Albuquerque's eccentricities were tenacious and often
crippling. And the chronic conflicts between urban and rural populations
that make the legislatures of most western states something akin to
madhouses has been aggravated all the more by cultural differences in New
Mexico. But New Mexico's and Albuquerque's poverty had always been
counterbalanced, to some extent, by its position as the most foreign and
arguably most culturally interesting of the 50 states, by the enormous
intellectual firepower of national security laboratories and universities, by
being the only indigenous Hispanic homeland left in the West, and the
prime location of the only Native American tribes to have survived the
onslaughts of European colonialization while remaining more or less
culturally intact.
Still, Albuquerque's geographic isolation has always kept it out of
step with national trends. As big cities in the west were disgorging out into
their remaining countrysides from the 1970s through the 1990s, Albuquerque
politics was at virtual deadlock between developers and conservationists.
And now, at the turn of the century, when many big cities in the west are
realizing, belatedly and probably too late, that they have to manage their
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growth, Albuquerque is racing as fast as it can to the developable edges of
town, despite threats of severe water shortages.
Its steady growth notwithstanding, Albuquerque never had an LAstyle, Denver, Las Vegas, Phoenix kind of boom. Its real estate prices never
inflated, and then imploded, like LA's did after years of overbuilding and
overpricing its housing stock of mansions. It never had the fortunes that
Colorado's mining traditions left Denver so it could re-create its downtown,
airport, and stadium as the symbols of success in the Rockies. It never had
the southern-like refrigerated-air society of Phoenix, with its culture of
newcomers, its retirement appeal, nor its proximity as a virtual bedroom
community to San Diego and Los Angeles, and its laid back affluent,
golfing-atmosphere so appealing to those who man corporate headquarters.
It never had the glamour nor the economic clout of Las Vegas, which
brought the entire state of Nevada into servitude to help keep that state's
economic dynamo growing and growing faster than anyplace in the west.
And it really never had Tucson's proximity to Mexico, its eco-activist
association with Edward Abbey or Joseph Wood Krutch, nor its close but
competitive relationship with a major city like Phoenix and its seemingly
unstoppable growth machine.
But even now inthis time of sprawl, Albuquerque has one major
asset that distinguishes it from these and other western cities-the
unequaled vastness, variety, and endless magnificence of the New Mexican
landscape, which still has, despite the Albuquerque-Santa Fe corridor, the
wonderful and paradoxical feeling of a civilized wilderness, wild but
deeply cultured.
For over 30 years as a journalist, I've tried to look at Albuquerque's
built environment as a natural resource modified by human choice in this
most spectacular and humblingly beautiful setting. In well over 1600
columns in many publications, I've tended to portray Albuquerque as a
lovable, even wonderful place, for all its foibles and follies. Ten years ago,
the University of New Mexico Press published my book A City at the End of
the World. I saw Albuquerque then as being one of those rare forgotten cities
with most of its great potential still to be realized. Now, I'm not so sure.
In the ten years since the book was published, the people who think
of New Mexico as an empty space waiting to be filled with generic
corporate gimcracks and the marketing fruits of bad ideas that have
cluttered up the rest of the nation and the West with a babble of strip malls,
neon commercial graffiti, and sprawling suburbs appear to be winning the
war for Albuquerque's identity. And I have to admit I'm really not sure
why.
Ten years ago I thought that Albuquerque was "poised.. .to become
a model post-end-of-the-world city--one that makes the most of being
'remote beyond compare' by shifting the emphasis of its environmental
public policies from consumption to conservation-the conservation and
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actualization of local identity."' I think I was wrong. Instead of actualizing
its individuality, and making the most of its cultural complexity, arid
limitation, and vast natural beauty, Albuquerque's built environment has
slipped ever more closely into becoming indistinguishable from the
anonymous edges of any one of a hundred other western American car
towns. But I have to say, too, I don't think that was the city's deep intent.
Albuquerque's urban landscape has not only languished in a mire of
unfulfilled promise, but that unsettling disappointment also has been
punctuated by rare, but heartening, surprises.
Who would ever have guessed that hidden in the smoggy
atmosphere of dispiriting stagnation, Downtown Albuquerque, after more
than 30 years of desolation, would actually be revived, somewhat, with a
major new movie house, an Alvarado Hotel-like transit center, and three
new courthouses?
It has been a shock for many to realize that at the beginning of the
new millennium the leading urban clients for modern New Mexico design
strategies are the formerly impoverished Indian Pueblos of Santa Ana,
Sandia, and Isleta. (In our state, it seems, though, that everything good
comes with its painful barbs and stickers, in this case gambling casinos and
a glut of Pueblo resorts and golf courses.)
And it feels almost unnatural that in our deeply libertarian,
boomtown atmosphere two progressive urban think tanks-Shared Vision,
Inc. and 1000 Friends of New Mexico-would have arisen to try to bring
some sanity to our development patterns, or that City Hall, County
Government, and citizens could have created a 750 page "Planned Growth
Strategy," emphasizing infill rather than sprawl development, which many
elected officials and business people say they like.
Who would have thought that the Twin Mountain Construction
Company and the New Mexico State Highway Department could have
redesigned and rebuilt, with minimum hassle and wasted time, something
of a masterpiece of aerial roadways to replace the old eye sore of the Big I
crossroads of 1-40 and 1-25? And who's not surprised that the hated
Montafto Road Bridge, for 40 years the object of raging political battles,
would actually get constructed and become not only a monstrous gusher of
unregulated gridlock into the rural North Valley, but would also, ironically,
be one of the more beautiful bridges in the state?
I would never have bet that state land commissioner Ray Powell
could have partnered with Sandia National Laboratories and the
Department of Energy to design a 2800 acre nature refuge and
environmental education campus on the eastern edge of its Mesa del Sol
development next to Isleta Pueblo land. And I couldn't have really
imagined ten years ago that the Nob Hill Main Street Project would create
a successful and energetic shopping and dining zone, anchored by a local
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eatery called Flying Star, which competes successfully with any restaurant
in town.
Perhaps the greatest and happiest surprise is a work of communitydesigned affordable housing and infill called Arbolera de Vida. Located in
the Old Town area's Sawmill District, on the old Duke City Lumber Yards,
the Sawmill community advisory council worked with the City of
Albuquerque, which owned the 27-acre project site, to create a model infill
development for low income New Mexicans. The City and Sawmill
residents developed the Sawmill Community Land Trust, a private nonprofit corporation to hold the land for the community. The Trust prohibits
real estate speculation and absentee ownership, keeping houses affordable
over many generations and guaranteeing community control of design. The
residents of the Saw Mill neighborhood and city planners have given
everyone in Albuquerque solid proof that it's possible for local interests to
engage in respectful growth and to defeat the deadening forces of generic
economics and design.
But even with these sweet amazements and startling successes,
Albuquerque's promise as a unique city is starting to be overwhelmed by
generic change that pays no attention to the ecological realities of our fragile
landscape and chaotic weather patterns-just like Los Angeles and Phoenix
two decades ago and Las Vegas today. We know that, despite the
appearance of the 1000 Friends of New Mexico, "smart growth" is not a
term warmly embraced by the power structure here. And that coolness
comes even in the face of the "Beyond Sprawl" managed-growth initiative
by the Bank of America in California and New Mexico in mid-1995. Even a
major lender with a considerable and at times decisive role to play in our
city's growth couldn't change minds here. We know that despite a
genuinely progressive young mayor in Los Ranchos, John Hooker, who fills
public debate with arguments about "new urbanism" and the creation of
self-contained developments designed to cut down on commuting and car
travel, few with clout in Albuquerque, other than defeated-mayor Jim Baca,
take that seriously either.
With the exception of Baca's four year tenure in the late 1990s and
his deft orchestration of the revival of downtown, none of the old agenda
of the 1970s, outlined so clearly in the much updated and amended
Albuquerque/Bernalillo County Comprehensive Plan, has yet to be
fulfilled.
In fact, it seems that all through the 1990s, during one of the greatest
booms in American economic history, Albuquerque decided neither to
focus on shoring up its New Mexican authenticity, despite planning
mandates to do so, nor to adapt its water usage to its desert climate.
Albuquerque's elite didn't have to do anything innovative at all to get
richer. Nor did the historical circumstances of the 1990s present the city's
leadership with the kind of direct challenges that stimulate productive
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change, except, of course, for the looming crisis of water scarcity, which
only in the new millennium began to be timidly and haltingly addressed.
No one I've talked to over the last 30 years of observing
Albuquerque politics has much of a clue about how land use and other
environmental decisions are really made here. And neither do I. We all
know, of course, the functions of the various governmental agencies and
committees, but the Wizard of Oz remains hidden. And except for
population size and general sprawling expansion, nothing much seems to
change, or really has changed since the 1950s. The pattern here is that when
land development clashes with cultural passions and environmental
imperatives it adapts itself to the obstructions, flows around them, and then
prevails and keeps moving relentlessly on. Mayors and City Councils come
and go, business leaders hoist a corporate hero who makes pronouncements
and then moves to another city, inspired planners and powerful Deans of
the University of New Mexico School of Architecture and Planning
articulate grand visions and are forgotten; neighborhood advocates and
managed growth activists rise up and are heard and then subside
exhausted. Frustrated big wigs and dealmakers complain bitterly that
Albuquerque's growth is stalemated by conflict, but that's an illusion. Just
look at how the city has grown. No place is free from regionally
unresponsive generic development. No part of the city is free of sprawl.
How then are land use decisions made? Though I'm groping
around in the fog like everyone else, it seems not unlikely to me that the
answer is something like this: First, the leadership community works in
mysterious ways because it is, itself, deeply fragmented and defuse,
reflecting Albuquerque's overall status as a City of Babel. Second, New
Mexico's general impoverishment allows many decisions tobe made almost
by default without the kind of governmental oversight that's needed. And,
third, Albuquerque's major news outlets-the Albuquerque Journal and
electronic media that uses it as a news source-are so unreflective and
growth oriented that land use issues hardly ever furrow their collective
editorial brows.
Fragmentation and unaccountability are the easiest to analyze.
Albuquerque City Government is non-partisan. No national political party
is attached to any land use decision. The buck stops with no one. Coalitions
are hard to build. Policies are often developed ad hoc. The closest thing to
an enduring land use lobby comes from development interests who have
been pushing the same uncontrolled growth agenda, and opposing virtually
any and all regulation, for the better part of 50 years. The electorate is kept
at bay by a regional planning body called the Middle Rio Grande Council
of Governments (COG), which produces virtually all transportation studies
and masterminds all transportation decisions through a committee known
as the UTPPB or Urban Transportation Planning Policy Board, comprised
of elected officials from virtually every jurisdiction in the region. These
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elected officials, however, have no region-wide constituency, each coming
from a particular town, city, county, or tribe. Hence they are accountable to
no general electorate for decisions that affect the whole middle Rio Grande
metro area but perhaps benefit only one area to the detriment of many
others. It doesn't help, either, that UTPPB members serve all but
anonymously thanks to the aversion to local news evidenced by most major
print and electronic media here. And the UTPPB has never seen a road it
doesn't love. When you combine the workings of the UTPPB with county
and city environmental planning commissions in Albuquerque, Rio Rancho,
and four counties, all of which are composed mostly of people who make
their living selling or developing land, then add to this mix a fragmentation
of business organizations, which include multiple chambers of commerce,
Rotary clubs, the Albuquerque Economic Forum, and other groups, and a
vast but hopelessly fragmented body of some 130 neighborhood
associations, not to mention such arcane political entities with enormous
clout over water like The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
(MRGCD) and theAlbuquerque Metropolitan Arroyo and Flood Control
Authority (AMAFCA), you see what a mess it is.
Is it any wonder that normal citizens, whom polls have shown for
years are opposed to sprawl and rapid growth and favor slower more
considered infill development, feel they're never taken into account when
land use decisions are being made-unless of course they take developers
and politicians to court? When voters are ignored, their only recourse is to
change roles and become plaintiffs.
So it is no surprise then that in the last ten years none of the old
political land use controversies were resolved, especially the consolidation
of city and county governments, which the leadership elite has pushed for
years and the newly elected mayor, centrist democrat Martin Chavez, has
pledged to make a reality, despite the bitter protest of county voters.
But while the city grows and public policy stumbles along,
staggering new problems, long unattended to, are indeed now slowly
breaking into public consciousness. These new problems are symbolized by
water warfare between towns and cities, farmers, Native Americans,
environmental interest groups, and massive new developments on the far
edges of town. If ever evidence were needed that the years and years of
environmental planning and general palaver about growth, and the
ecological stress that comes from too much of it, have come to little or no
avail, look far, far west and far, far east.
The Albuquerque Academy's Mariposa development, with its 7,000
proposed houses in an "environmentally sensitive planned community" on
the outer limits of Rio Rancho near US 550, almost halfway to San Ysidro,
touts itself as having learned the necessary lessons about smart growth and
new urbanism. And perhaps it has. The only problem is that it amounts to
the farthest vanguard of urban sprawl in the history of westside
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development. It is so far from other houses or any jobs that residents there
could end up being stranded in their luxurious sensitivity during an oil
crisis as severe as those of 1974 and 1979.
Or take the Campbell Ranch development outside of Albuquerque
on north Highway 14 in the east mountains, with its hotels, golf courses,
and thousands of houses on 18,000 acres. In what's been called "one of the
most extraordinary moments in the history of local government," 2
Campbell Ranch, after concluding that Bernalillo County planning
regulations were too restrictive, petitioned successfully to be annexed into
the town of Edgewood in the Estancia Valley many miles from its
development site. There's never been an annexation like it. Talk about
stretching a point! And Edgewood, as of January 2002, was being sued by
Santa Fe County to make sure the town has the money it will take to
provide all the services Campbell Ranch will need, so county government
won't have to.
Former Albuquerque Mayor David Rusk, who lost his bid for reelection in 1981, once argued that Albuquerque's metro area growth was
uncomplicated by the same kind of jurisdictional fracturing that plagues
Denver, Los Angeles, and other western cities. When it comes to sheer
volume of jurisdictions, that's still true. But both governments and citizen
action groups in Rio Rancho, Placitas, Corrales, Cedar Crest, Tijeras, Los
Lunas, Belen, Bosque Farms, Edgewood, Sandoval County, Valencia
County, Torrence County, and Sandia, Laguna, Santa Ana, and Isleta
Pueblos make enough of a jurisdictional jumble that it's hard even for
nationally dominant corporations, at times, to get much done in our area.
Even Wal-Mart failed in the late 1990s to get a foothold in the Village of
Tijeras, largely due to the opposition put up by the extremely well
organized, conservation-oriented neighborhood group called the East
Mountain Legal Defense Fund. But Albuquerque and Bernalillo County's
urban form, as well as all their official efforts to contain sprawl, was
thwarted when Intel, the largest computer chip manufacturer in the world,
bought land in, and was feasted with $8 billion in industrial revenue bonds
by Sandoval County, right on the Bernalillo county line.
While to the casual observer Albuquerque and environs might still
look pretty much the same as they did in 1992, if not slightly worse, beneath
the physical and political surface vast forces of change are at work, and like
it or not, one day every government in the area will have to respond to
them.
I am intrigued by the coincidence that the two most dramatic forces
of change-the realization of water scarcity and the appearance of Pueblo
governments as major players in urban development-began almost
simultaneously, and oddly unnoticed, during the tenure of the all but
invisible mayor of Albuquerque, democrat Louis Saavedra, who served four
years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the almost insane first term of
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another all but invisible politician, republican Governor Gary Johnson, who
will end his eight years in office in 2002. As the story goes, Mayor Saavedra,
wanting to avoid major political struggles over water conservation, decided
to conduct a study instead, the first one of its kind, measuring
Albuquerque's aquifer using U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) monitoring
devices in city wells. As the data began to add up, it became clear to
hydrologists at the USGS that Albuquerque was not sitting atop a body of
water the size of Lake Superior as city boomers had always claimed. Rather
it was draining a number of relatively small deep pools of water-one near
Kirtland Air Force Base in the southeast heights and the other near the
Ladera section of the West Mesa-much faster than previously thought.
When that story was first reported in 1989 by Tony Davis of the Albuquerque
Tribune, hardly any one paid attention to it. It took almost the whole decade
for city officials and Albuquerque's invisible leadership community to
realize that our area is running out of water now. And many still don't
believe it.
The other profound unintended consequence of political
maneuvering was when the then young Gov. Gary Johnson rammed
through what turned out to be an unconstitutional set of compacts with
some nine Rio Grande Pueblo governments to allow "Indian gaming."
Johnson could not have imagined in 1996 that Pueblos around Albuquerque
would become so wealthy, and be so well-managed financially, that their
own development efforts could well become the single most determining
factor in Albuquerque's urban form over the next 50 years.
I'm not suggesting, though, that nobody saw Albuquerque was
facing major problems long ago. In 1986, the Albuquerque Tribune published
a 24-page pullout section called "Albuquerque 2000." 3 This set of analyses,
more than any other, reveals that Albuquerque has done almost nothing to
alter its growth and land use policies to fit contemporary conditions. In
1986, the city was working off plans, concepts, and aspirations that were at
least 30 years old. And I think it is safe to say that we are still operating on
that same view of the world at the start of the new millennium. In 1986, The
Tribunepredicted Albuquerque's water supply would be drying up and full
of contamination by the turn of the century. "Water might even have to be
pumped from the San Juan Basin, near Mount Taylor, to satiate
development on the West Mesa," The Tribune observed with prescience. It
added that "until the pocketbook dictates water use practices, it will be
tough to change Albuquerque attitudes. But conservationists believe the
effort should begin now." Albuquerque still has some of the least expensive
residential water in the Southwest. And what conservation has been
practiced in the last 15 years or so has been offset by population growth
stimulated by sprawl development that has been speeded up by roads and
bridges that were sold to voters as solving rush hour congestion but really
only jammed roadways all the more.
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Maybe it'sjust me, but trying to find a clear stream of logic running
through the last ten years of Albuquerque's urban history, I keep running
into streams of cause and effect as clogged up as Coors Boulevard at rush
hour. Perhaps one useful way to get at what has happened in the years
since those Tribune predictions is to concentrate on three polarized
situations: First, two competing plans with major potential influence, a
transportation plan that seems like a holdover from the Eisenhower era, and
a planned growth strategy that appears simultaneously to be the new
embodiment of the anti-sprawl progressive spirit of the 1970s but is a toolittle-too-late token gesture at managed growth. Second, two looming
scarcities, oil and water, and how they relate to the first two plans. And
third, two approaches to development, the Pueblo approach and the
developer-led, bottom line, laissez faire approach on the West Mesa with its
mile after torturous mile of miserable nonsense roads.
As Alan Reed, former Albuquerque City Councilor and prominent
member of the 1000 Friends of New Mexico, wrote in the organizations
newsletter, Nuestro Pueblo, the New Mexico State Highway Department's
"Middle Rio Grande Connections" study is full of "l6ops to nowhere."4 And
yet the "connections" study could become the underlying growth blueprint
in the metro area for generations. A major recommendation of the study,
which calls for building a superhighway called Paseo de Volcan west of
Unser on the West Mesa, was approved by a twelve-to-seven vote by the
UTPPB in mid January 2002. As there is not a living soul anywhere in sight
out there, Paseo de Volcan, a so-called loop road connecting 1-40 with US550, is a pure and simple golden gift to developers from the taxpayers of
New Mexico, a sprawl subsidy that really no one who follows the weather,
the economy, the water crisis, or the news about extended long term war in
oil country in the Middle East would ever dream of suggesting.
And that's not all. There is another proposed road that is truly
"shocking," according to Reed. The Middle Rio Grande Connections
"seriously advocates building two freeways between 1-40 west of
Albuquerque and NM (sic) 550..." The second loop road is so far west of the
Double Eagle II airport it doesn't really have a name. Reed, a democrat
turned republican, estimates the cost at about $12 million per mile, "leading
to a $240 million bill for the short freeway (Paseo de Volcan) and about $500
million for the longer freeway. The traffic demand" on the shorter road, he
says, "would amount to less than two percent of all interstate traffic! This
leads us to the conclusion that there is little traffic justification for either of
them. The only apparent beneficiaries would be land developers along the
routes."
The spin argument that loop roads provide a development
boundary for a city has long ago been debunked. Loops simply make it
possible for development to occur both inside them and outside them to a
virtually limitless degree, often extending the outer edge for miles. Reed is
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right, of course, about the complete lack of current traffic justification for
those roads. North Unser Boulevard, the farthest road west at the moment,
is a lovely, wide, winding road through some 18 miles of utterly barren and
supremely beautiful New Mexico countryside. You can pick it up past
Southern Boulevard and drive all the way to US 550 and pass by only one
little island of houses, connected by one forlorn little road. The irony is, of
course, that Unser along this stretch is about the best road on the whole,
overstuffed Westside.
Despite virtually every other article in the daily papers dealing with
impending water shortages, despite being worried about depleted oil
reserves and an uneasy dependence on foreign oil, even democrats are hot
for westside roads. Mayor-again Marty Chavez, whose first term and
second term are separated by the Baca administration, has vowed to do
everything he can to extend Paseo del Norte through the Petroglyph
National Monument and hook it up with a completed Unser. And that's
despite continuing and strenuous objections from Pueblos who consider the
site, and its "rock art," sacred ground for all the pueblos up and down the
Rio Grande. Considering that the major pueblos in the Albuquerque area
have unadjudicated senior water rights, and enough money to defend them
forever in the courts, one wonders why the Albuquerque mayor would
offend their religious traditions. New Mexico's republican congressional
delegation has already attacked Sandia Pueblo's claim to the northwest side
of the Sandia Mountains, using language that implied nefarious dealings,
charges that I'm sure no pueblo person will ever forget.
Ironically, the most newsworthy opponent of the Paseo del Norte
extension through the Petroglyphs National Monument is a national
environmental group called Republicans for Environmental Protection. Jim
Scarantino, president of the New Mexico Chapter, sees the roadway as an
instrument of sprawl just as 1000 Friends does. "One of the dirty little
secrets about sprawl is that it's a taxpayer ripoff," he is quoted as saying.'
Characteristically, the very conservative AlbuquerqueJournalwas outraged,
in an editorial entitled "When Enviros Protest Cost, Be Suspicious," that any
environmental group, Republican or not, should attach a taxpayer price to
a road extension.6 In Albuquerque, loyalty to the sprawl lobby comes even
before party loyalty, or so it seems.
If transportation planning has always been a spur to booming
sprawl development, what is known loosely as "comprehensive planning"
has been something of a conservative, restraining force. Since the 1970s, all
versions of the Albuquerque/Bernalillo Comprehensive Plan have
mandated that infill development be given at least equal priority to growth
on the fringes where roads and water and sewer lines, and police and fire
protection, are non-existent and must ultimately be paid for by taxpayers.
Infill means not only using up vacant land, but also maintaining the public
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resources and infrastructure that already exist within the city's developed
core, much of which is decaying.
The Comprehensive Plan was always an inspiration to
conservationists, but it had, as the saying goes, no teeth, no laws or
incentive strategies to encourage infill. In 2001, another comprehensive
planning document appeared-all 750 pages of it-that assigns priority to
infill development. It is called "The Planned Growth Strategy" and is a joint
effort by Bernalillo County and the City of Albuquerque.7 This massive
undertaking has what it calls seven basic ideas8 gleaned from Town Hall
meetings, citizen surveys, planning and engineering consultants, and
existing planning documents. No one has any idea, of course, if this
document and its suggestions will be any more fruitful in directing growth
to serve public needs and ease taxpayer expenses than the efforts of the
1970s. But I'd rather play the slots at a casino than bet it will.
Under the heading "What the Public Told Us They Wanted," the
seven basic ideas are (1)"Local government should play a proactive role."
This means that city and county officials should try to help developers stick
to the strategies' view of growth. (2) "Whether in new or older area, not just
development but community." This seems to be inspired by a "new
urbanist" emphasis on village-style development, emphasizing pedestrian
environments. (3) "The existing community-neighborhoods, schools, and
businesses--comes first in vitality and development." I presume this is an
infill development mandate. (4) "Maintain, rehabilitate, & improve
infrastructure in existing neighborhoods." (5) "Grow efficiently--develop
first where infrastructure exists." (6) "Don't just plan-implement." And (7)
"Keep us involved--every step of the way."
In Part Two of the Planned Growth Strategy, the "Preferred
Alternative," a call is made for "an urban development paradigm shift."9
Albuquerque's "existing paradigm for urban development is that
government will be responsive to incremental private development
initiatives with limited controls to avoid negative consequences."
Infrastructure planning is basically "reactive." "The City water and sewer
utility currently has no procedure to estimate the cost-effectiveness of
Urban development at the fringe largely is developer
service expansions ....
driven." This "reactive and piecemeal approach" has resulted in, among
other things, over-crowded schools and streets "in growing fringe
areas;.. .[and] a more than $700 million dollar backlog of infrastructure
deficiency projects, deficiencies in the street system which exceed the cost
of supporting new urban development for the next 25 years...."
The development community seems oddly unperturbed by these
suggestions. They see The Planned Growth Strategy as, indeed, a growthoriented plan of attack. Whereas, in the past, development interests loudly
objected to giving infill priority status, here "developers and 'smart growth'
advocates agree," according to a report by Albuquerque Tribune business
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reporter Nancy Salem.1" The Home Builder's Association of Central New
Mexico thinks the plan makes sense because it supports predictable, stable
growth and "growth generates income." The smart growth 1000 Friends of
New Mexico seems to like it for its balance. More progressive water
conservationists, on the other hand, think it's baloney, because they see no
discussion of water in the plan. Maybe I'm being cynical, but there is a good
chance that developers and their lobbying organizations are unfazed by the
Planned Growth Strategy's emphasis on building in areas with existing
infrastructure because most of the low cost fringe development in the future
will take place outside of Albuquerque and Bernalillo county-in Sandoval,
Santa Fe, and Torrence Counties, and in Rio Rancho, and Los Lunas and
Belen-and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the plan.
For instance, some of the most beautiful and spiritually inspiring
land forms on the planet, with views across the Santa Ana reservation to the
Jemez Mountains on US 550, are about to be despoiled by Rio Rancho
developers, once those new western loop roads are built. Any development
out there amounts to a desecration, as far as I'm concerned. I always used
to take out-of-town friends and family up US 550 to look at the view as you
topped out onto what we think of as the Zia/Santa Ana Valley with its long
view of the red cliffs of the Jemez Mountains and southern edges of the gray
and white banded Bisti badlands. That "viewfield," as planners and
builders call it, is irreplaceable and every bit as startling and monumental
as the view of the Sandia Mountains from the opposite direction. It has been
a nasty surprise to watch the land approaching that view get bulldozed
over and transformed into a red dust, Martian no-man's land. But perhaps,
in the odd way the world works, what to some people is an unthinkable
calamity will rescue those desert views from the depredations of suburbia.
The unthinkable might, indeed, be upon us. Both current
transportation planning and managed growth strategies could well run up
against the inevitable bottoming out of the basic resources of oil and water.
And in overbuilt, arid, vast central New Mexico, a shortage of either one is
a disaster, while a shortage of both could amount to what corporate merger
masterminds might call the "creative destruction" of our present state of old
fashioned thinking.
Will the world find itself in a price-spiraling oil crisis any time
soon? It didn't take much in 1974 and 1979 for shortages and high prices in
imported petroleum to reverberate destructively through the whole
American economy. And in New Mexico, the effects were close to crippling,
even then when the vast majority of our metropolitan population was still
living within the core area. Unlike today, the far fringes of the desert and
the mountains, miles away from jobs and essential retail centers, were still
reserved for pioneers and easterners who didn't know any better. But I get
nervous when I stumble across book reviews and articles that refuse to
deny the possibility of a major oil shortage coming from war and social
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unrest in the Middle East. And I get really upset when I see book reviews
of obscure but highly credible texts like Kenneth S. Deffeyes's work from
Princeton University Press called The Impending World Oil Shortage.An oil
geologist turned Princeton professor, Deffeyes, according to reviewer J.R.
McNeill in the Wilson Quarterly," predicts that "world oil production will
peak between 2004 and 2008 and decline thereafter, with potentially
calamitous consequences." I can just smell the carcasses of rotting sport
utility vehicles (SUVs) all over Rio Rancho and the-East Mountains. An oil
crisis in Albuquerque right now would leave everyone hurting and tens of
thousands all but stranded in their commuter exurb utopias.
And I can't imagine what might happen if oil prices up the costs of
trucked-in food so much that poor people here have a harder time making
ends meet, especially if Albuquerque and Rio Rancho and big
developments on the fringes are buying up water rights from farmers. With
various PR machines still grinding out enticements for businesses and
homeowners to move to our city, I wonder sometimes if we would have
enough wet water left to grow our own food if we needed to?
But despite my own dark broodings, when it comes to thinking
about water, Albuquerque is in an entirely different state of mind than it
was ten years ago. From my perspective as a columnist, the water scene
looks fairly straight forward, even if agencies, corporate bureaucracies,
activists, and politicians all try to mess it up with funny money numbers.
It is hard to pin anyone down on exact figures. But it doesn't take a
statistician to see that the overall picture isn't very good for growth, or for
just simply watering our lawns and trees.
Even though such a venerable thinker about land speculation and
ranching as former Governor Bruce King once told me, "V.B., ya can always
find more water," many conservationists and people in state government,
and in city and county agencies all over New Mexico, are worried that there
really might not be enough water to go around anymore. They fear that the
humane idea of "shared scarcity" could get pulverized by the win/lose
water combat ahead. They know the era of federal water projects is over.
There are no new rivers to dam. Generally speaking, all the water in the
west is already spoken for, so is there anyplace left to turn? For some
prominent thinkers, agricultural water is the great hope of cities and
developers. For farmers, though, cities seem like cartoon vultures licking
their chops.
William Riebsame, a professor of geography at the University of
Colorado, Boulder, figures that "if half the agricultural water use in the
West shifted to urban uses, the region could support, at its current rate of
use, a fivefold increase in urban population, and this without extracting a
single new drop of water from streams and aquifers." Riebsame argues that
80 to 90 percent of western water is used for agriculture. He goes so far as
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to say, "The West is too wet."12 He adds, however, that getting that water
won't be "painless." That's the understatement of the decade.
My reading of New Mexico's situation is much different than that.
If Albuquerque doesn't get its annual 48,000 acre feet of San Juan/Chama
project water, John Stomp, city water planner, told me, the City will go
south to Socorro and Sierra Counties and buy up all the water rights it can.
In fact, farmers and organic growers in the south say Albuquerque is
already looking for paper water. And if that isn't enough, the City can
always go out to Grants, I hear, and buy water from its Blue Lake aquifer,
the same water that Peabody Energy needs to use to run its expanded coal
mine and proposed new power plant 25 miles north of Grants on the Lee
Ranch. Everywhere I look, I see conflict when it comes to Albuquerque
getting more water: conflict with Pueblos and their senior water rights,
conflict with the Navajo and their claims to San Juan Basin water, conflict
with acequia associations, with farmers, with other municipalities and
developments, with river advocates and endangered species
conservationists, and the venerable Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District and its hundreds of miles of irrigation and drainage canals in the
Middle Rio Grande Valley. The MRGCD contends that any draining off of
the agricultural water from its unlined ditch system will threaten the trees
and green spaces in the North and South Valleys of Albuquerque and
fundamentally destroy their semi-rural character. There just seems no end
to conflict, because New Mexico is not too wet.
And the weather is not helping either. Scientists are reportedly
worrying about the last three dry years here being the beginning of a ten-totwenty-year drought. The last one of those, in the mid 1950s, saw Elephant
Butte Lake go dry as a bone for almost three years. Albuquerque's aquifer,
the USGS tells us, is being depleted so fast that we could be in a crisis
situation within 40 years, even with new San Juan/Chama water. The
arithmetic just never quite adds up when highly touted city conservation
efforts are compared to growth projections.
Horror stories in other towns abound around us, too. Santa Fe has
been on stringent water restrictions for the last two years. Las Vegas, New
Mexico, has had year-round water conservation measures in effect since
1999. Both cities are just plain running out of water. Las Vegas, New Mexico,
has been using too much of the flow from its main water source, the
Gallinas River, and is being sued by acequia farmers downstream. And
even with that extra water, Las Vegas still cannot bring its water budget
into the black. El Paso, Texas, and JuArez, Mexico, are years, not decades,
away from outgrowing their rights to underground water, and
Alamogordo, New Mexico, is so hard up it is thinking about desalinization
and using heavily treated wastewater for drinking. Mexico has its own
claims to Rio Grande and Pecos river water that might impinge on farming
practices on the east side of New Mexico.
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Questions about water quality still rise up from time to time, as
well, even though nobody really wants to think about them. Even boomer
optimism can't avoid superfund sites in the South Valley and West Mesa,
EPA warnings about high arsenic levels in our water, controversies over an
old nuclear waste dump on Sandia Base, and endless news reports of
leaking underground gasoline storage tanks and septic systems in the
Valleys, not to mention hundreds of anecdotal stories over the years of
increased birth defects and other maladies in the South Valley around the
convergence of an old meat packing plant, above ground petroleum storage
tanks, and numerous defense contractors and the plume of contaminants
that state and federal scientists have been tracking for years.
Water is not something you can bank on in New Mexico. As an
editorial in the Santa Fe New Mexican put it, "This is a desert state of overdiverted rivers, over-pumped aquifers and over-subscribed water rights; we
can't go on behaving as if we live on the Mississippi Delta."13 For all the
transportation and land use plans Albuquerque and New Mexico have
generated over the years, it is an amazement to me that we still have
nothing that resembles a regional water use plan, much less a state water
use plan. We don't even have an accurate, or at least credible, inventory of
all our water sources that the public and their representatives could readily
refer to.
In all the thousands of news reports about water in the last years,
I have never seen a reliable, hard-number estimate on how much pumpable
water Albuquerque has left in its aquifer. I'm sure an exact number is hard
to get. But not to have even a ballpark figure in public circulation makes the
rest of the calculations virtually meaningless. If we don't know how much
we have, how can we subtract our yearly usage from the total and project
how much time we have until it is all gone? Yet we keep biilding golf
courses. If we don't link population growth to water usage soon, then all
our conservation measures and projections are pure fantasy, based on our
current metro-area population of 727,000. The Middle Rio Grande Council
of Governments forecasts our population will double by 2050. A mere 20
years from now, we'll have grown to 950,000. If 60 percent of city water use
is residential, such a population explosion will make conservation
meaningless. And even if we do secure the 48,000 acre-feet a year from the
San Juan/Chama Project, how is that going to help us 50 years from now
when our children are ready to retire, if we've added, say, another 100,000
acre-feet of residential usage to our current 170,000 acre-feet a year pumped
from the aquifer?
Add to all this the rise of the Pueblos as major players in
development around Albuquerque's fringes, including the possibility of 99year lease subdivisions, and the water issues all up and down the middle
Rio Grande Valley become a consternating mess of uncertainties. There is
no question that Pueblo developers will become the target of others who
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complain about their so-called special privileges as "sovereign" entities, and
who bitterly argue against their senior claims to water, and their often
legally and historically well-documented ownership of contested lands.
Most observers would agree, I think, that the best privately
financed large developments in our region of late have come from the
Pueblos. The Santa Ana casino/hotel complex outside of Bemalillo could
have been an aesthetic disaster, but it is amazingly low key architecturally
and aware of its place in the landscape. And Santa Ana's brand new Hyatt
Tamaya hotel, down by the pueblo's part of the bosque, is arguably among
the handsomest, least obtrusive, most New Mexican of new hotels in the
state. What a far cry Tamaya is from the anonymous but skyline dominating
Hyatt 'hotel towers in downtown Albuquerque, subsidized by federal
grants, with City Hall as the architect's client. Albuquerque's officials
characteristically took what they could get, which was a clone of buildings
in Texas. Santa Ana's officials demanded and got a building with the sense
of place they wanted.
Once it accumulated sufficient capital, Sandia Pueblo abandoned
its eyesore white tent casino on 1-25, and created an elegant, low lying, landrespecting casino on the lower foothills of the Sandias that is a model of
how such developments should be designed. Far from being a disrespectful
monstrosity that ruins the view of the mountains, Sandia's casino complex
puts to shame the developers who have cluttered up the West and East
Mesas with standard, anyplace strip malls, glaring signage, and
subdivisions.
There is little doubt among architects and planners I know that
Sandia, Isleta, and Santa Ana are planning more development, possibly
subdivisions to compete with the more shoddy work of non-tribal
developers. They could raise the standard considerably, while sucking up
more and more water from the aquifer. Sandia Pueblo's Governor Stuwart
Paisano plans to go slowly in working with the 2000 developable acres
around his casino, where it is possible new restaurants, high-end retail
outlets, and perhaps even housing could be built. "We're in a position
where we don't have to act right away," Paisano was quoted as saying."'
From what I have seen so far, if necessity demands, I would welcome a
development competition between westside developers and the Pueblos. I
would bet the Pueblos could build better quality houses in perhaps even
innovative clusters and enclaves, like La Luz, on the West Mesa, and use the
marketplace to force other developers to clean up their acts.
It is the work Santa Ana and Sandia have done so far on their
bosques that sets them apart in our region. Both tribes have been working
to restore the bosque under their control, clearing out non-native plants,
removing the fire hazards of old timber, and generally opening up the
riverside woods to become, once again, a usable and spacious gallery of
cottonwoods much like it was before the war. I think of that effort and
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compare it to how developers and politicians have allowed the Westside to
go to pot, a planning disaster that has left residents there with the worst
roads in the metro area. What could be more of a disaster than the donkey
trail known as Golf Course Road, which passes for a major north south
arterial on the westside? That is a road elected officials allowed developers
to get away with, a haphazard, afterthought of a road that everyone has to
use and hates, as they wait and wait in long lines, cursing who knows who?
How does something like that get built? By default. And who defaulted?
The Albuquerque area leadership elite.
The over all picture of the last ten years tells a sad story of lost
promise, lost opportunity, and failed leadership that amounts to a metroarea that has grown in a state of anarchy-undisciplined, imprudent,
unrestrained. And yet, despite all the over extension of resources, all the
wasteful unlimited development and generic new design, all the
heedlessness to warnings about water shortages, and the stubborn
insistence on maintaining the unworkable status quo at any price,
Albuquerque remains in places pretty much the inviting city it has always
been, a college town, a scientific utopia, the intellectual center of America's
most foreign state, a place of vast natural beauty and enormous human
talent whose physical form is still happily overshadowed by the grandeur
of its high desert landscape. But for how long?
When Albuquerque lost its triple A baseball Dodger farm team, The
Albuquerque Dukes, which went to the northwest coast, city movers and
shakers, including its bankers and investment moguls, couldn't put up the
civic energy, nor the bucks, to find on their own another baseball team,
despite the efforts of Mayor Jim Baca and the overwhelming support of this
sports crazed community. The leadership elite was looking after its own
business as usual, and not paying its civic dues. Mayor Baca finally found
a Chicago financier who summers outside of Las Vegas, New Mexico, to
come to the city's rescue, buy another team, and stimulate the construction
of a new stadium. This seemingly unrelated incident mirrors what appears
to me to be the dominant mind set in Albuquerque since 1992-a leadership
elite that works almost exclusively for private gain and does relatively
nothing to influence constructive and realistic public policy. And I'm
troubled that I see no political alternative in the works, certainly nothing
approaching the kind of coalition building that has helped
environmentalists and ranchers create a new spirit of cooperation and
scientific give and take about how best to use private and public leased
grazing land. Albuquerque needs the leadership of a powerful group of
enlightened business leaders, smart growth advocates, cultural activists,
environmentalists, farmers, developers, and labor unions to do the kind of
serious thinking and jawboning it takes to break through the status quo of
city building by default. But I've yet to see anything like that on the political
horizon.
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It may well be that the only thing that can rescue Albuquerque's
built environment from total generic anarchy over the next decade is the
harsh discipline of necessity in the form of an international oil crisis and
price hikes, drought, and the inevitable water wars and growing shortages
that no one, not even boomer optimists, can explain away any longer as
environmental hype and illusion. Albuquerque's years of internal struggle
since World War H, its fundamental political war between advocates of
prudent, regional, respectful growth and helter skelter do anything
anywhere sprawl, could well be decided in the next twenty years when
limits are reached and local leadership has to take its civic duty seriously
and start to do what it takes to make Albuquerque into a city that adapts
itself to its natural surroundings and arid conditions and begins the long
process of learning how to design with nature and not against it.
The major challenge of designing with nature in the new
millennium, it seems to me, is for all large cities in the West to begin the
creative and political processes necessary to retrofit themselves to meet
increasingly harsh conditions, or to simply survive extended interim
periods in which old, worn out forms of energy and energy-infrastructures
are replaced by new technologies on a massive scale. And that time seems
to be coming fast. Although New Mexico is about to put on line seven new
power generation plants, large and small, to export energy to Phoenix and
Southern California, in hopes of avoiding the price gouging electric
shortages of 2001, at some point the grid, along with major gasoline
pipelines and sea lanes, might simply become too dangerous as a national
security threat to be allowed to exist in their present condition."5 Although
the other major cities in the West are probably beyond retrofitting their
urban form and may be reduced instead to gearing up new transportation
strategies and techniques, Albuquerque still has something of a chance to
design itself out of the disastrous consequences of a major energy shortfall.
But the window of opportunity is shrinking in a hurry. The more Rio
Rancho continues to support and even stimulate growth on its farthest
boundaries, the more Los Lunas and Belen expand, the more Sandoval
County becomes a corporate and industrial "bedroom community" for
Albuquerque, then the more constricted our opportunities become and the
more the Middle Rio Grande Valley approaches the point of no return in
which we, too, will be reduced to enduring drastic economic down turns
and painful life changes while American industry converts to new power
sources. And like every other major car town in the west, new energy
sources, however utopian, will do little to solve our common desperate
problems-climate fluctuations, water shortages, a ruination of the
ecological commons, and might-makes-right water laws across state and
international boundaries. It seems that Albuquerque has really only one
chance to compete successfully with other western cities while it still can.
It must learn how to prosper while prudently anticipating energy
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transitions and reducing its water consumption, something that no other
mammoth urban competitor is equipped to do anymore. Perhaps
Albuquerque's isolation and boomless economy will prove to be
unintended blessings in a new world in which even just being a little
smaller and more compact gives a city a competitive edge in surviving hard
times. Although I think a trend analysis of Albuquerque politics since
World War H makes such a hope objectively unfounded, I still believe it is
better to court the energy of naive optimism than settle into the inertia of
cynical depression.
ENDNOTES
1. V.B. PRICE, A CITY AT THE END OF THE WORLD 138 (1992).

2. Long time local observer Wally Gordon made this assessment in his article "Analysis:
Edgewood Makes History," in an east mountain tabloid called The Independent, Which has
nothing to do to with the venerable, but defunct, New Mexico Independent run for years in the
1970s and 1980s by Mark and Mary Beth Acuff. See Wally Gordon, Analysis: Edgewood Makes
History, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 5-11, 2001, at 13.
3. This remarkable document was published on September 8, 1986, and covered

everything from population growth, healthcare, crime, and the economy to the water supply,
education, transportation, and the environment. See Albuquerque 2000, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB.,
Sept. 8., 1986, Special Pullout Section.
4.
5.
2001, at
6.

NuESTRo PUEBLO (1000 Friends of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M.) Fall 2001, at 3.
Kate Nash, Grouptakes-pre-emptive strike at Paseo extension, ALBUQuERQUE TRIB., Nov.
Al.
When EnvirosProtestCost, Be Suspicious, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Nov. 23,2001, editorial page.

7. "The Planned Growth Strategy" is billed as being "NOT 'no growth' or 'slow growth,"
presumably in an effort to detach the idea of growth management from the bogus accusation

that conservationists advocate no growth. The two volumes of The Planned Growth Strategy
have no date or other references attached to them. I remember receiving my copies some time
in early to mid 2001. The City Council and County Commission will consider it, observers
assumed, before the end of 2002.
8. These are spelled out in an undated, unauthored handout that accompanied the two
volume "Strategy."
9. BERNALILLO COUNTY, N.M., & CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., THE PLANNED GROWTH
STRATEGY, at 4-11.
10. Just the Beginning, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Jan. 21,2002, at ABQBizl.
11. J.R. McNeill, Book Review, WILSON Q., Autumn 2001, at 150 (reviewing KENNETH S.
DEFFEYES, HUBBERT'S PEAK: THE IMPENDING WORLD OIL SHORTAGE (2001)).
12. William E. Riebsame, Geographies of the New West, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE:
EXPLORATION IN COLLABORATIVE CONSERVATION AND THE AMERICAN WEST 50 (Philip Brick et
al. eds., 2001).
13. SANTA FE NEw MEXICAN, Jan. 19,2002, at A5.
14. Patrick Armijo, Tribe's Plan Is Cautious,ALBUQUERQUE J., WE STSIDE, Nov. 24,2001, at
Al.
15. Amory B. Lovins & L. Hunter Lovins, Energy Forever,in THEAMERICANPROSPECT30-34
(Walter Dean Burnham ed., 2002).

